The New Force in Government
When armed force becomes the arbiter of intergovernmental disputes, democracy has already begun to fail.
When Legal Disputes Turn Physical
In a startling development that has sent shockwaves through Washington's institutional framework, a series of unprecedented physical confrontations between government agencies highlights what some experts are calling a dangerous new frontier in American governance. These incidents, involving a group known as DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) operating under Elon Musk's leadership, represent a potential inflection point in how power is exercised within the federal system.
Armed Confrontations Replace Legal Process
The first warning signs appeared when DOGE representatives attempted to enter the US Africa Development Foundation, an independent agency. Upon initial refusal, they returned the following day with individuals claiming to be US Marshals who were reportedly armed. Using physical force, they gained entry, locked out staff, and changed the locks. More recently, after being turned away from the US Institute of Peace, DOGE representatives returned with apparent FBI support and, according to reports, broke into the building. When the Institute called DC police for assistance against trespassers, officers instead facilitated DOGE's entry and removed Institute officials.
These incidents represent a fundamental shift: the substitution of legal process with physical force. Traditionally, disputes over agency independence or executive authority would be settled through courts, legal opinions, or legislative action. The introduction of armed personnel to resolve such disputes signals a dangerous precedent where institutional boundaries are determined not by law but by force.
The Collapse of Institutional Independence
If normalized, this approach to governance would effectively eliminate the concept of independent agencies within the federal system. Agencies established by Congress to operate with degrees of independence from direct executive control—a hallmark of American administrative design—would exist at the pleasure of whoever controls the coercive apparatus of the state.
The US Institute of Peace and the US Africa Development Foundation were both created by Congress with specific independence provisions. Their ability to resist executive overreach depends entirely on other institutions respecting their statutory independence. When armed personnel override these legal protections, the entire framework of checks and balances begins to unravel.
The Privatization of Government Force
Perhaps most alarming is the apparent delegation of government coercive power to private entities. DOGE, led by presidential donor Elon Musk, appears to be exercising authority to deploy or direct federal law enforcement resources, including allegedly armed US Marshals and FBI agents. This represents a potentially unprecedented privatization of government force.
In functional democracies, the use of state force follows clear chains of command, with transparent legal authority and accountability mechanisms. The involvement of private citizens directing armed federal agents against other government entities exists in a dangerous gray area outside established constitutional frameworks.
The Path to Authoritarian Governance
Democracy scholars have long identified the politicization of law enforcement and security forces as a critical warning sign of democratic backsliding. When armed agents become tools of political factions rather than neutral enforcers of law, the fundamental compact of democratic governance begins to dissolve.
The pattern emerging from these confrontations bears uncomfortable similarities to early stages of institutional capture seen in deteriorating democracies worldwide. The initial targets—small, independent agencies with limited public profiles—suggest a testing of boundaries that could eventually expand to more consequential institutions.
Legal Accountability in Question
Attempts to obtain information about these actions through standard transparency mechanisms have reportedly been blocked. Democracy Forward, an organization litigating against these actions, notes that Freedom of Information Act requests related to the role of US Marshals have been denied, forcing resort to federal courts merely to understand what authority DOGE is operating under.
This opacity itself represents a departure from democratic norms where government actions, particularly those involving force, must be transparent and legally justified to the public.
A New Paradigm of Power
If these incidents become the new normal, American governance would fundamentally transform from a system based on legal authority to one based on physical control. Agencies would no longer derive their independence from statutes but from their ability to physically defend themselves or align with more powerful factions.
Government officials could find themselves physically removed from offices despite having legal authority to remain. Policy disputes traditionally resolved through administrative procedure or judicial review would instead be decided by which side can marshal greater physical force.
Constitutional Crisis in Slow Motion
These confrontations potentially represent a constitutional crisis unfolding in real time. The American system was designed with the understanding that even the president's authority has limits, particularly regarding independent agencies established by Congress. When these boundaries are breached through force rather than legal process, the constitutional order itself is called into question.
Those who dismiss these incidents as isolated or insignificant miss their profound constitutional implications. Once normalized, the use of force to resolve intergovernmental disputes would fundamentally alter the relationship between branches of government and undermine the rule of law itself.
Conclusion: The Stakes for Democracy
American democracy has weathered numerous challenges throughout its history, but the introduction of armed force into disputes between government entities represents a particularly dangerous development. When guns replace gavels as the final arbiter of governmental authority, the essential nature of democratic governance is compromised.
The question facing institutions and citizens alike is whether these incidents will be recognized as the serious breaches they represent and addressed through robust legal and institutional responses, or whether they will mark the beginning of a new, more authoritarian approach to governance where power flows not from law but from force.
The stakes could not be higher. As Democracy Forward's president noted, these confrontations mirror patterns seen in declining democracies worldwide. The normalization of such tactics would not simply represent a change in administrative procedure—it would signal a fundamental transformation of American governance away from constitutional democracy and toward something far more troubling.
The Militarization of Bureaucratic Disputes: Historical Patterns in Failing Democracies
The events described in the transcript—where armed forces are being deployed to resolve what should be bureaucratic or legal disputes between government entities—follow a recognizable pattern that has appeared repeatedly throughout history when democratic systems begin to deteriorate. These actions represent more than isolated incidents; they reflect a fundamental shift in governance that has preceded democratic collapse in numerous historical cases.
The Instrumentalization of Security Forces
When governments begin to fail, one of the first observable patterns is the transformation of security forces from neutral enforcers of law into instruments of factional power. This transformation typically follows a predictable sequence:
1. Parallel Power Structures
The creation of parallel power structures outside traditional chains of command is a classic early warning sign. In the scenario described, DOGE operates as a parallel structure to established government bureaucracy, empowered to override normal procedures.
Historical Parallel: In the late Weimar Republic (1930-1933), the increasing use of presidential emergency decrees allowed the circumvention of normal parliamentary procedures. This created parallel governance structures that undermined institutional integrity before Hitler's formal assumption of power.
2. Targeting Low-Profile Institutions First
Authoritarian takeovers rarely begin with assaults on high-profile institutions. Instead, they frequently target lesser-known agencies with limited public visibility and support networks.
Historical Parallel: Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power in Russia began not with attacks on major ministries but with the methodical capture of regulatory agencies, regional authorities, and specialized commissions that controlled resource flows but garnered little public attention.
3. Blurring Lines Between State and Party/Private Interests
The apparent delegation of state coercive power to a private entity (DOGE) directed by a presidential donor (Elon Musk) reflects another common pattern in failing democracies: the deliberate blurring of lines between state resources and private or partisan interests.
Historical Parallel: In Hungary under Viktor Orbán, government functions were progressively outsourced to private entities controlled by regime loyalists, creating a parallel state structure outside traditional accountability mechanisms.
Physical Control Superseding Legal Authority
Perhaps the most alarming historical pattern evident in these events is the substitution of physical control for legal authority—what scholars of democratic backsliding call "force majeure constitutionalism."
1. Creating Facts on the Ground
The physical occupation of government buildings creates "facts on the ground" that override legal disputes about jurisdiction or authority.
Historical Parallel: In the 1973 Chilean coup, the military takeover began with the physical occupation of government buildings and communications infrastructure before any formal transfer of power. Similarly, during Turkey's democratic backsliding under Erdoğan, physical control of institutions preceded legal changes justifying the new power arrangements.
2. Law Enforcement as Political Actors
When law enforcement agencies become participants in political disputes rather than neutral arbiters, democratic guardrails rapidly deteriorate.
Historical Parallel: During Argentina's institutional collapse in the early 2000s, police forces increasingly chose sides in political disputes, protecting some government buildings while allowing others to be occupied by political factions aligned with certain officers or units.
3. Selective Enforcement Creating Institutional Uncertainty
The reported behavior of DC police—removing legitimate officials while allowing the entry of contested authorities—creates profound institutional uncertainty about which rules actually govern.
Historical Parallel: In the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, selective enforcement of law created a system where institutions could never be certain which rules would be applied, leading to paralysis and eventual surrender to executive authority.
Bureaucratic Resistance and Democratic Resilience
The resistance of these agencies to DOGE's incursions represents what political scientists call "bureaucratic resistance"—the tendency of institutional actors to protect their autonomy even as central authority becomes more authoritarian.
Historical Parallel: In Peru during Alberto Fujimori's self-coup in 1992, several regulatory agencies initially resisted executive overreach, though most eventually capitulated when it became clear security forces would not protect their institutional independence.
The Degradation of Institutional Boundaries
Democratic systems depend on clear institutional boundaries maintained by shared norms rather than constant physical enforcement. When those boundaries require physical defense, democracy has already begun to fail.
1. Normalization of Extraordinary Measures
The use of armed personnel to resolve administrative disputes represents the normalization of extraordinary measures for routine governance issues.
Historical Parallel: The Roman Republic's collapse accelerated when the deployment of armed forces within the city of Rome—previously taboo—became increasingly normalized for political disputes, culminating in the crossing of the Rubicon by Caesar's legions.
2. Functional Jurisdictional Collapse
These incidents suggest a collapse of functional jurisdiction within the government, where the traditional authorities of different agencies no longer operate according to established law.
Historical Parallel: The Yugoslav federal system's collapse began with disputes over which level of government had authority over specific functions, with physical control increasingly determining outcomes rather than constitutional arrangements.
Opacity and Information Control
Democracy Forward's reported inability to obtain information through Freedom of Information Act requests reflects another common pattern in failing democracies: the deliberate creation of information asymmetries.
Historical Parallel: In Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro, access to information about government operations became increasingly restricted, with even basic facts about institutional authority becoming contested or obscured.
Faction Over Function
Perhaps most fundamentally, these events reflect a shift from functional governance (where institutions perform their designated roles regardless of partisan leadership) to factional governance (where institutional function is subordinated to loyalty to the dominant faction).
Historical Parallel: This pattern was particularly evident in the Italian Fascist takeover under Mussolini, where government ministries were progressively transformed from functional bureaucracies into extensions of party power, with those maintaining professional independence being forcibly brought into alignment through similar confrontations.
Conclusion: The Tipping Point Question
History suggests that democracies facing this pattern of institutional degradation stand at a crucial tipping point. The question is not whether these actions represent democratic backsliding—they unquestionably do—but whether institutional resilience and public response will be sufficient to reverse the deterioration.
When armed force becomes the arbiter of intergovernmental disputes, democracy has already begun to fail. The remaining question is whether that failure will be temporary or terminal. The historical record offers examples of both outcomes, though recovery becomes increasingly difficult once physical force replaces legal authority as the operating principle of government.
In nearly every historical case where democratic systems recovered from such episodes, recovery required robust institutional resistance, judicial intervention, public mobilization, and often international pressure. Absent these counterforces, the militarization of bureaucratic disputes has consistently presaged deeper democratic collapse and the eventual consolidation of authoritarian rule.
John Adams' Moral Algorithm: A Foundation for Stable Governance
Introduction: The Moral Compass of Governance
John Adams' articulation of government's purpose—what might be called a "moral algorithm" for governance—provides a profound counterpoint to the institutional degradation described in recent events. His declaration that "Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men" establishes a fundamental principle that, when followed, creates remarkable stability in democratic systems.
This moral framework, when consistently applied, functions as a stabilizing force against the very patterns of institutional decay we observe when armed confrontations replace legal processes in government operations. Let us examine how adherence to Adams' principle creates resilience against democratic backsliding.
The Common Good as Stabilizing Force
Preventing Factional Capture
When government is oriented toward the common good rather than private interests, it becomes inherently resistant to factional capture. The recent confrontations between DOGE and independent agencies represent a classic example of factional interests (in this case, those aligned with a private donor's vision) superseding the common good.
Adams' principle directly challenges the legitimacy of using state power—particularly armed force—to advance private or factional interests. By establishing the common good as the touchstone for legitimate governance, this moral algorithm creates an evaluative standard that delegitimizes actions like those described, regardless of their technical legality.
Creating Institutional Coherence
Government agencies operating under Adams' principle share a common purpose despite their different functions. This shared moral orientation creates institutional coherence that transcends bureaucratic boundaries and partisan divisions.
When agencies understand their ultimate purpose as serving the common good rather than factional interests, interagency disputes naturally gravitate toward legal resolution rather than forceful confrontation. The very idea of one government entity using armed force against another becomes absurd when both recognize their shared commitment to public welfare.
Protection and Safety: The Legitimate Use of Force
Redirecting Coercive Power
Adams' algorithm properly orients the use of state force toward protection and safety of the people rather than enforcement of factional control. In a government faithfully adhering to this principle, armed personnel would never be deployed to settle bureaucratic disputes or enforce contested claims to authority.
Instead, coercive power would be reserved exclusively for protecting public safety and constitutional order. The reported use of US Marshals and FBI agents to force entry into independent agencies represents a fundamental perversion of force from its legitimate purpose (protecting people) to an illegitimate one (enforcing factional control).
Creating Security Through Legitimacy
When force is used exclusively for public protection rather than factional advantage, it creates a form of security that is self-reinforcing. Legitimate use of force builds public trust, which in turn enhances voluntary compliance with law, reducing the overall need for coercive action.
Conversely, when force is perceived as serving private interests—as in the DOGE confrontations—it undermines this virtuous cycle, generating resistance that ultimately requires ever-increasing applications of force to maintain control.
Prosperity and Happiness: The Metrics of Success
Redirecting Administrative Focus
Adams' principle establishes clear metrics for evaluating governance: the prosperity and happiness of the people. This stands in stark contrast to metrics focused on efficiency, control, or alignment with executive priorities that might justify forcible takeovers of independent agencies.
When prosperity and happiness serve as the ultimate measures of governmental success, administrative disputes naturally orient toward substantive outcomes rather than control of institutions. The physical occupation of buildings becomes irrelevant compared to the question of which policies best serve public welfare.
Building Institutional Trust
Governance oriented toward public prosperity and happiness builds deep reservoirs of institutional trust. This trust functions as a stabilizing force during periods of political transition or crisis, preventing the escalation of disputes into confrontations requiring force.
The reported events reflect a profound deficit of this institutional trust—where changes in administration are treated as opportunities for hostile takeover rather than democratic transition within a shared commitment to public welfare.
The Right to Reform: Legitimate Paths to Change
Channeling Reform Through Democratic Processes
The second part of Adams' principle—the right "to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it"—provides a critical legitimizing framework for governmental change. Crucially, this right belongs to the people collectively, not to any faction, individual, or even elected official.
This principle channels the impulse for reform through democratic processes rather than executive decree or armed confrontation. The reported actions of DOGE bypass these legitimate channels, attempting to implement contested visions of reform through force rather than persuasion, legislation, or judicial determination.
Preventing Revolutionary Instability
By acknowledging the legitimacy of reform while channeling it through democratic processes, Adams' principle prevents the instability that comes from either rigid resistance to necessary change or revolutionary approaches that bypass democratic constraints.
This balanced approach to reform creates adaptive stability—where government can evolve to meet changing needs without surrendering to authoritarianism or descending into institutional chaos where armed confrontation becomes the method of resolving disputes.
Practical Applications of Adams' Moral Algorithm
In Executive Decision-Making
An administration guided by Adams' principle would approach independent agencies with respect for their statutory independence, recognizing that institutional pluralism serves the common good by preventing concentration of power in any single faction.
Disputes over agency jurisdiction or authority would be channeled through courts or legislative clarification rather than resolved through executive fiat backed by physical force. The moral algorithm provides a clear framework for evaluating when intervention is legitimate—only when demonstrably necessary for "the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people."
In Bureaucratic Culture
Within the bureaucracy, Adams' principle would foster a culture where professional obligation to the common good transcends loyalty to particular administrations or factions. This professional ethos creates natural resistance to inappropriate politicization or weaponization of government functions.
Civil servants guided by this moral algorithm would recognize their ultimate accountability to the public rather than to political appointees alone, creating institutional resilience against authoritarian capture.
In Judicial Oversight
Courts applying Adams' principle would scrutinize the use of force between government entities with the highest level of skepticism, recognizing such confrontations as presumptively inconsistent with government's fundamental purpose.
This judicial approach would prevent normalization of force as a mechanism for resolving intergovernmental disputes, maintaining the primacy of law over power that defines constitutional democracy.
Historical Validation: Stable Governance Through Moral Consistency
The American Experience
The periods of greatest stability in American governance have consistently aligned with fidelity to Adams' principle. The post-WWII consensus, despite significant policy disagreements, maintained remarkable institutional stability precisely because competing factions broadly accepted the common good (however differently defined) as government's legitimate purpose.
Conversely, periods of breakdown—from the Civil War to Watergate—arose when factions prioritized their interests over the common good, eventually reaching for increasingly extraordinary measures to maintain control.
International Comparisons
Looking globally, the most stable democratic systems consistently demonstrate commitment to Adams' principle, even across different constitutional arrangements. Nordic democracies, for instance, have maintained remarkable stability despite significant policy shifts between left and right governments, precisely because the underlying commitment to the common good transcends partisan differences.
Conclusion: The Stabilizing Power of Moral Purpose
The confrontations described represent more than procedural irregularities or partisan overreach—they reflect fundamental deviation from the moral purpose of government as articulated by Adams. When government actions serve private or factional interests rather than the common good, they inevitably generate resistance that escalates toward confrontation and force.
Adams' moral algorithm provides not just an ethical framework but a practical foundation for stable governance. By orienting all government action toward the common good, channeling reform through democratic processes, and delegitimizing the use of force for factional advantage, this principle creates resilience against exactly the patterns of democratic decay evident in these confrontations.
The path back from the brink of democratic failure inevitably requires recommitment to Adams' principle—not just in rhetoric but in the practical conduct of governance at every level. When government truly serves "the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people" rather than faction, the very idea of resolving administrative disputes through armed confrontation becomes unthinkable, revealing such actions for what they truly are: fundamental betrayals of democratic governance itself.